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In the standard competitive labor market equilibrium there is no particular incentive for job 
separations to occur, since employees could not improve their labor market position by 
conducting a switch to another firm from their current matches. In contrast to this conjecture, 
there is a great deal of microlevel evidence on the dynamics of labor markets that points out 
that market economies are in a state of continuous turbulence (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger 
1999; Farber 1999). Accordingly, flows of workers between jobs and between labor market 
states are large by any reasonable standards.  
 
Search theory and empirical search models typically concentrate on the role of a wage in 
explaining job changes. Another potential reason for the existence of job switch intentions 
and on-the-job search is adverse working conditions, which are without doubt a very 
important attribute of a job match. If the wage does not sufficiently compensate for adverse 
working conditions, employees can increase their utility by switching jobs. Although non-
wage job characteristics can be included in search models (e.g. Blau 1991; Hwang et al. 1998; 
Lang and Majumdar 2004), this possibility has attracted more attention in the empirical work 
that is less directly tied to search models.  
 
Extensive analysis of turnover has been made in human resource management (HRM) and 
personnel psychology, where attention centers on the personnel policies and job attitudes of 
the employees. There is also, however, an increasing interest in labor economics to 
incorporate information on working conditions and worker attitudes into the analysis of 
turnover. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the interactions between 
adverse working conditions, job satisfaction, employees’ intentions to quit and actual 
separations within a uniform econometric framework that allows us to put together pieces of 
evidence that have been discovered in the literature. 
 
Previously, empirical studies have analyzed directly how individual characteristics and 
working conditions or job attributes affect employees’ probability of quitting or their job 
duration. Adverse working conditions have been found to increase quits. In most of these 
studies the data on working conditions are not from individual employees’ workplaces, but 
rely on, for example, industry injury rates or work attributes typical of different occupations 
(e.g. Viscusi 1979; Bartel 1982; Herzog and Schottman 1990; Gronberg and Reed 1994). 
However, in some studies workplace-specific attributes are used. For instance, Manning 
(2003) uses information on night shifts to explain job duration. 
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Another strand of the literature explains quits or job durations directly by means of job 
satisfaction scores, the employee’s characteristics, and firm characteristics, but without 
information on job attributes (e.g. Flanagan et al. 1974; Freeman 1978; Clark et al. 1998; 
Ward and Sloane 2000; Clark 2001; Kristensen and Westergård-Nielsen 2004; Delfgaauw 
2007; Lévy-Garboua et al. 2007). These studies discover that dissatisfied workers are more 
likely to quit their current matches. In other words, the self-reported level of job satisfaction is 
a good predictor for job mobility beyond the effect of wages. Working the other way, Akerlof, 
Rose and Yellen (1988) show that job changes lead to an increase in job satisfaction and 
Altonji and Paxson (1988) present evidence that job mobility leads to more satisfactory 
working hours. 
 
In the HRM literature the relationships of job satisfaction, organizational commitment and 
withdrawal cognitions to actual turnover have been analyzed (e.g. Cotton and Tuttle 1986; 
Tett and Meyer 1993; Griffeth et al. 2000), using a variety of characteristics of the employees 
and firms. Variables that describe certain aspects of adverse working conditions have been 
included in some of these studies.  
 
Furthermore, psychological studies show that the intentions of individuals are good predictors 
of their actual behavior (e.g. Steel et al. 1984; Tett and Meyer 1993). Similarly, Kristensen 
and Westergård-Nielsen (2004) report that job search, which is an extreme form of intentions 
to quit, is a good predictor of actual quits. When no data on actual separations has been 
available, the impact of working conditions and/or job satisfaction on quit intentions or job 
search has been examined in some studies in labor economics (e.g. van Ophem 1991; Shields 
and Price 2002; García-Serrano 2004; Sousa-Poza and Henneberger 2004) and the HRM 
literature (e.g. Hellman 1997).  
 
Our purpose is to study employees’ quit intentions and actual separations using Finnish data. 
The country has a fairly centralized wage bargaining system. The binding collective labor 
agreements already contain some pecuniary compensation for adverse working conditions. 
One could therefore think that working conditions may not matter a lot for quit intentions. 
However, the apparent heterogeneity of workplaces makes it hard for the collective labor 
agreements to take into account all the relevant aspects of working conditions. Collective 
agreements also lead to wage compression, which may prevent the creation of compensating 
wage differentials. Hence, employees’ subjective valuations of their working conditions can 
differ greatly from the ones that have been stipulated in the collective agreements by the 
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central organizations of employees and employers. Accordingly, our earlier evidence points 
out that perceived working conditions have a very minor role in the determination of 
individual wages in the Finnish labor market (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2006), in contrast 
to what the theory of compensating wage differentials would imply. Instead, adverse working 
conditions substantially increase the level of job dissatisfaction and the perception of 
unfairness of pay. It is therefore interesting to study whether this dissatisfaction gives rise to a 
desire to find another job. 
 
This paper deviates from the earlier ones in this field of research in some important respects. 
First, we have a data set, the Quality of Work Life Survey of 1997, that includes not only job 
satisfaction scores, but also detailed information on several different aspects of working 
conditions at the workplace, not just conditions typical of the occupation or industry. It is 
possible to take advantage of this rich information on the prevalence of adverse working 
conditions as determinants of job satisfaction and employees’ quit intentions. A drawback of 
the data set is that it is a single cross-section. On the other hand, there is a variety of 
information on both perceived job switch intentions and actual on-the-job search, so that 
different measures of employees’ quit behavior can be compared. Second, the Quality of 
Work Life Survey can be matched to longitudinal, register-based employer-employee data 
maintained by Statistics Finland, which allows the identification of actual job switches of the 
survey respondents for the period (1998-2002) after the Quality of Work Life Survey was 
gathered. We can therefore analyze the degree to which employees’ quit intentions and on-
the-job search that may arise in the environment of adverse working conditions lead to actual 
job switches. 
 
The data at hand make it possible to model the relationships between working conditions, job 
satisfaction, and employees’ quit behavior. In the first reduced-form models, we explain 
alternative binary indicators of quit intentions and actual job switches by individual 
characteristics, firm characteristics, and measures for adverse working conditions. In the 
second, extended model, we examine the interrelationships of the variables in more detail. We 
first explain the binary indicator of job satisfaction with adverse working conditions and by 
industry and occupation indicators. A binary indicator of quit intentions is then explained by 
job satisfaction and the employees’ personal characteristics. Finally, actual job switches 
obtained from the longitudinal employer-employee data are explained by quit intentions, 
wage, and some other personal characteristics. This model forms a system of probit models 
that have endogenous dummy explanatory variables. Since the system is recursive, it can be 
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estimated as a multivariate probit model. This approach is similar to that used by Shields and 
Price (2002) and Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2005), but they used only one very specific 
indicator of working conditions, racial harassment. In addition, they derive their results from 
data covering a very specific labor market (i.e. British nurses and US military, respectively) 
making it difficult to generalize the results obtained, and they do not incorporate information 
on actual job switches. Furthermore, Scott et al. (2006) estimate a closely related structural 
model for job satisfaction and intentions to quit, but they do not study actual job switches and 
the model is not estimated in a multivariate framework. 
 
In this article, we discover that employees currently facing adverse working conditions have 
greater intentions to switch jobs and also search for new jobs more frequently. Multivariate 
probit models point out that job dissatisfaction that arises in adverse working conditions is 
related to job search and this in turn is related to actual job switches. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We first describe our hypotheses and the modeling 
approaches. An overview of the data is provided next. The results are then presented and a 
summary concludes.  
 
Hypotheses and Modeling Approaches 
 
Explaining Employees’ Quit Intentions and Actual Job Switches With Job Disamenities. We 
start the analysis with reduced-form models to test the hypothesis of compensating wage 
differentials. Assume that quit intentions and actual quits depend on wage and job 
disamenities, and wage adequately compensates for the disamenities. Then the disamenities 
should have no independent effect on intentions to quit and separations. However, based on 
the literature, we can expect that the prevalence of perceived job disamenities increases 
employees’ quit intentions and actual job separations even when we do not include wage 
among the explanatory variables. This may arise from labor market imperfections like 
imperfect information, collective bargaining (e.g. Daniel and Sofer 1998), and various 
frictions in labor markets (e.g. Manning 2003). If wage was included, the equation could in 
principle give the wage-disamenity trade-off (e.g. Herzog and Schottman 1990). We use 
probit models where we explain binary indicators of quit intentions and actual job switches 
directly by means of adverse working conditions.1 We have several alternative measures for 
quit intentions, which are explained in the next section. As explanatory variables we have 
dummy variables that describe various aspects of disamenities and various individual and 
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workplace characteristics. It is important to note that when we estimate the probit model for 
actual job separations we assume that job satisfaction and job disamenities in 1997 reflect the 
values of these variables as long as the individuals stay in the same plant over the five-year 
period (1998-2002).2  
 
The choice of explanatory variables is partly determined by arguments from the large 
literature on job search in the labor market (e.g. Eckstein and Van den Berg 2007). The 
probability of quitting should decrease with tenure, because longer current tenure is consistent 
with a longer implicit search process that has not yet led to a job switch. This increases the 
overall probability that the current match between a worker and a firm is among the best 
available in the labor market. While much of the work deals with search when the worker 
unemployed, there have been empirical analyses of on-the-job search by Blau (1992), 
Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994), and Manning (2003), among others.  
 
There are other important variables that have a potential influence on on-the-job search and 
actual job switches. Empirical studies have demonstrated that there are employee 
characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, and education that are important 
determinants of on-the-job search. In addition, past job changes have been found to predict 
future separations (e.g. Munasinghe and Sigman 2004). Controlling for past labor market 
behavior may also help in obtaining a coefficient for tenure that is not affected by worker 
heterogeneity in the propensity to quit. 
 
In addition to the individual employees’ characteristics, we also include, among the 
explanatory variables, various characteristics of the workplace, like indicators of high 
performance work practices (team work), plant size, industry, and the regional unemployment 
rate. A complete list of the variables is explained in detail in the next section. 
 
Interaction of Disamenities, Satisfaction, Quit Intentions and Actual Job Switches. The 
second model is formed to test the hypothesis that job disamenities decrease job satisfaction, 
which in turn has an impact on employees’ quit intentions that finally matter for actual job 
separations. Formally, in the first step we explain our measure of job satisfaction by discrete 
measures of disamenities and with some other variables that describe the workplace. The true, 
unobserved (latent) job satisfaction is a continuous variable z*, which is explained by the 
variables X1. We observe the binary measure of job satisfaction z, if the latent measure is 
greater than zero. The model and the observation rule are therefore 
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zi* = X1iβ1 + ε1i                                                                                                               (1) 
zi = 1(zi*>0) 
 
where 1(.) is an indicator variable and i indexes the individuals. In the second stage, quit 
intentions are explained by the observed binary job satisfaction variable z and variables X2. 
Again, there is an underlying unobserved continuous measure of quit intensity q*, which is 
observed as a binary indicator q of observed quit intention or on-the-job search. We refer to 
this as the quit intentions equation: 
 
qi* = γzi + X2iβ2 + ε2i                                                                                                                                                                        (2) 
qi = 1(qi*>0) 
 
This second equation gives, in principle, the wage-satisfaction trade-off. In the final stage of 
our analysis, actual job switches are explained by means of the observed quit intentions q and 
variables X3: 
 
si* = δqi + X3iβ3 + ε3i                                                                                                                                                                        (3) 
si = 1(si*>0) 
 
where s* is latent job switch and s a binary indicator for observed actual job switch. 
 
It is assumed that at all stages there are unobserved individual characteristics and therefore the 
error terms of the different stages are correlated. For this reason, these estimation results may 
differ from the ones based on reduced-form models that have been used more frequently in 
the literature. The unobserved individual characteristics can, for example, be attitudinal 
factors stressed in the HRM literature on mobility or individual characteristics that affect 
occupational choice or unobservable productivity characteristics that are not captured by the 
traditional human capital variables that are available in the Quality of Work Life Survey. The 
three equations form a system of discrete dependent variable models with endogenous dummy 
explanatory variables.3 The model is recursive in the sense that job satisfaction explains quit 
intentions and quit intentions explain actual quits, but job switches do not explain intentions 
to quit or job satisfaction, and intentions to quit do not explain satisfaction. Because of this 
recursive structure, and assuming normally distributed errors, the model can be estimated as a 
multivariate probit model (e.g. Greene 2003). We use the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane 
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(GHK) simulated maximum likelihood estimator implemented to Stata by Cappelari and 
Jenkins (2003). 
 
To identify the parameters of the model it is not necessary that the variables X1, X2, and X3 
are different (Wilde 2000), since the model can be identified through the nonlinear functional 
form. However, it is still good practice to exclude some variables from the equations.4 There 
is no comprehensive theory that would give sharp predictions about which variables should be 
included in the Xs, because the role of non-wage job attributes is mostly analyzed in the 
empirical literature that is not directly linked to search models. Based on the discussion above 
and our results by using the same data (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2006), we include in X1 
occupation and industry dummies that do not appear in the other equations, and some 
characteristics of individual workers, like education, which appear in the other equations. In 
addition, X1 contains some employer features like plant size that have been found to affect job 
satisfaction (e.g. Clark 1996). In X2 we incorporate more personal characteristics, including 
wage. As discussed above, in a compensating differentials framework wage and job 
disamenities should wipe out each other. However, as there are most likely labor market 
imperfections that prevent compensating differentials from operating, we include them both. 
This also gives the wage-disamenity trade-off. Finally, X3 comprises wage and variables that 
are related to the individual, but some variables are excluded from X3 that are included in X2 
(two measures for the payment system at the workplace). Further, X3 contains the regional 
unemployment rate that is not included in X2, or in X1. Regional disparities in unemployment 
are substantial in Finland. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that regional labor market 
conditions greatly matter for one’s success in realizing job switch aspirations.5 
 
Data 
 
The primary data set that we are using in this paper is the Quality of Work Life Survey 
(QWLS) of Statistics Finland (SF). It is conducted at irregular intervals. We use the data from 
the year 1997. The initial sample for QWLS is derived from a monthly Labour Force Survey 
(LFS), where a random sample of the working age population is selected for a telephone 
interview. The 1997 QWLS was based on LFS respondents in September and October who 
were 15-64-year-old wage and salary earners with a normal weekly working time of at least 
five hours. 3795 individuals were selected for the QWLS sample and invited to participate in 
a personal face-to-face interview. Out of this sample, 2978 persons or around 78 percent 
participated (Lehto and Sutela 1999) in the interviews, which took place in the period 
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between September and December. Owing to missing information on some variables for some 
workers, the sample size used in this study is around 2750 observations.  
 
The QWLS survey contains a number of questions about the subjective views of workers with 
respect to their working conditions, as well as about the perceived job satisfaction. In 
addition, QWLS includes information on the personal characteristics and work experience of 
the respondents. SF supplements QWLS with information from the LFS on, for example, 
working time and exact labor market status. Supplementary information on the industry and 
location of the employer as well as annual earnings and the level and field of education of the 
respondents was gathered from various registers maintained by SF. The variables that we are 
using and descriptive statistics are documented in Appendix (Table A1). 
 
The phenomena that we are interested in explaining are employees’ quit intentions and actual 
job switches. We have information on those employees who would change jobs within the 
same occupational field, if they could receive the same pay as now (around 24 percent of 
employees), and on those who would switch for the same level of pay to another occupational 
field (around 25.5 percent).6 From these measures we can derive an indicator of intentions to 
quit, Switch Intentions, which is the sum of the two sub-cases (49.5 percent).7 
 
As to on-the-job search behavior, we have two measures that are used in the models. Searcher 
Last Six Months is a dummy variable that indicates that the employee has looked for another 
job at some stage during the last six months (15.2 percent of the employees). Searcher Last 
Four Weeks is a dummy for employees that have searched for a job during the last four weeks 
(6.4 percent of employees). There is one inconsistency between the measures that capture 
actual job search. Among those that report having looked for another job in the last four 
weeks 14.8 percent say that they have not looked for another job in the last six months. An 
explanation for this is that the Searcher Last Six Months variable comes from the QWLS 
questionnaire filled in during a personal interview, whereas the Searcher Last Four Weeks 
variable comes from the LFS telephone survey that is done before the QWLS questionnaire is 
filled. It is possible that some respondents have forgotten what they answered in the LFS 
survey and some respondents may have thought that six months is “the last six months, not 
accounting for the last four weeks”.8 
 
The QWLS data is a cross-section data set that does not as such include any information on 
actual job switches. However, the QWLS data can be matched to longitudinal register data, 
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FLEED (Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data). FLEED is constructed from a 
number of different registers on individuals and firms that are maintained by Statistics 
Finland. In particular, FLEED contains information from Employment Statistics, which 
records each employee’s employer during the last week of each year.9 Matching of these data 
sources is possible, because both the QWLS data and FLEED contain the same unique 
personal identifiers (i.e. ID codes for persons). We have followed the employees over the 
period of 1998-2002, since it may take some time before intentions to quit and on-the-job 
search finally materialize as actual job switches. This is a particularly relevant point in the 
environment of persistent unemployment, where the number of suitable vacancies is limited. 
This has been the situation in Finland, since unemployment has been high since a deep 
recession in the early 1990s. (According to LFS, the unemployment rate in Finland was 12.7 
in 1997.) Actual job switches of the employees are defined based on changes in the employer 
plant codes. Using plants rather than firms to define the job switches matches, as closely as 
possible, the information in the QWLS data, because the questions on adverse working 
conditions refer to the plant level. Our measure for actual job switches or separations is 
Actual Switch, which obtains value one when an employee is during the period 1998-2002 at 
least once in a different plant than in 1997 (38.4 percent of the employees). Unfortunately the 
data set has no information on the reasons for terminating the employment relationship, so we 
cannot distinguish between quits and layoffs.10 
 
Because the connection between intentions to quit and actual mobility has rarely been 
analyzed in the literature, it is useful to provide some descriptive evidence. Simple cross 
tabulations of the variables show that Actual Switch is most closely associated with a dummy 
that captures employees who have searched for another job during the last four weeks. 50.3 
percent of those who have searched during the last four weeks have actually changed their job 
over the period 1998-2002. The corresponding shares for Switch Intentions and Searcher Last 
Six Months are 42.0% and 46.6%, respectively. 
 
Job satisfaction in the QWLS data is measured by the alternatives 1 (very satisfied: 30.6 
percent of respondents), 2 (quite satisfied: 63.1 percent), 3 (rather dissatisfied: 5.3 percent), 
and 4 (very dissatisfied: 1 percent). We form a job satisfaction dummy (Satisfied) that 
indicates the highest satisfaction category 1.  
 
The subjective valuations of harms and hazards related to working conditions are measured in 
the QWLS survey by the use of different categories. For perceived harms, there is a five-point 
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scale in which the highest category corresponds to the perception by a worker that a feature of 
working conditions is ‘very much’ an adverse factor at the workplace. For perceived hazards, 
the highest category among three possibilities is the one in which the respondent considers a 
feature at the workplace as ‘a distinct hazard’. Responses to the questions about adverse 
working conditions can be aggregated by forming a dummy variable that equals one if there is 
at least one clearly adverse factor (Harm) and a dummy that equals one if there is at least one 
distinct hazard (Hazard). These variables capture largely different aspects of the work 
environment.  
 
We use the following dummy variables as other job disamenities. Uncertainty indicates that 
there is at least one clear insecurity factor at the workplace and Neglect is a dummy for the 
existence of at least one aspect where the worker gets no support from superiors. 
Additionally, we have a dummy variable for mentally very demanding work (Heavy 
Mentally), poor advancement opportunities (No Promotion), and discrimination at the 
workplace (Discrimination). We include a large set of control variables, which can be 
regarded as ‘the usual suspects’ based on the literature (see Table A1). 
 
Findings 
 
Results from Reduced-form Models. We estimate probit models for job switch intentions, on-
the-job search and actual job switches. The explanatory variables are the same in all four 
models. To make the results easier to read, we report marginal effects instead of parameter 
estimates in Table 1. For the dummy variables the entries in the table are differences of 
probabilities evaluated at values 1 and 0 of the dummy. The results show that employees 
currently facing adverse working conditions have more intentions to change their matches.11 
In particular, those who are more willing to change their jobs are those who face at least one 
notable harm or factor of uncertainty, those who feel neglected by their superiors, have 
mentally heavy work, feel that they have no promotion chances or face discrimination (Table 
1, Column 1). Based on the evidence, the only perceived job disamenity that does not have an 
influence on intentions to quit is the one that captures hazards.12  
 
Employees currently facing unpleasant working conditions tend to search for new jobs more 
frequently (Table 1, Columns 2-3). Uncertainty and poor promotion chances have a clear 
positive impact on both of the on-the-job search variables. Job search during the last six 
months is also positively affected by the feel of neglect and the prevalence of discrimination. 
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Furthermore, job search during the last four weeks is intensified by the existence of at least 
one perceived harm.  
 
The marginal effects of the disamenity variables on on-the-job search are lower than on job 
switch intentions, as could be expected, since actual search requires more active involvement 
than intentions. The pseudo R2 of the models is higher when on-the-job search is explained 
than in the models for job switch intentions or actual job switches. One interpretation of this 
is that unobservable individual characteristics are more important in the determination of 
intentions and actual job switches. 
 
Adverse working conditions are much less tied to actual job switches than to job switch 
intentions or on-the-job search, based on the reduced-form models (Table 1, Column 4). This 
is particularly interesting, because the effects of perceived working conditions on actual job 
separations have not been examined previously. The only variables describing adverse 
working conditions that get the expected positive coefficients at least at the 10% significance 
level are the dummy variables for mentally heavy work and discrimination. In contrast, those 
who are employed at a workplace with at least one hazard, feel neglect and have no promotion 
prospects have been less likely to actually switch their jobs over the period 1998-2002.13 This 
finding may emerge, for instance, because those employees have poor unobservable 
productivity characteristics that are not captured by our standard human capital variables. 
This would explain the fact that they are stuck at workplaces with adverse working conditions 
and face difficulties in finding a suitable new match at the same time. Naturally, the omitted 
variable of personal productivity could also have an influence on our results for intentions to 
quit and job search. As explained earlier, unobservable individual characteristics provide the 
most important motivation to estimate multivariate probit models, where the correlation 
between the error terms of the equations is allowed. 
 
Taken together, our results point out that uncontrolled variation in wage is not enough to 
compensate for the effects of job disamenities, because they have an independent effect on 
employees’ intentions to quit. Accordingly, labor markets are in disequilibrium at any given 
point of time in the sense that employees located in adverse working conditions are forced to 
look for outside opportunities in order to improve their labor market position. This is 
inconsistent with the existence of adequate compensating wage differentials for adverse 
working conditions, but consistent with frictions and non-competitive labor markets as 
outlined, for example, by Manning (2003). 
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We briefly summarize some interesting results concerning the control variables included. 
Employees with temporary contracts and part-timers search for new jobs more frequently 
(Table 2, Columns 2-3).14 Education has a positive impact on job switch intentions and on-
the-job search. It is likely that more educated workers face more opportunities in the labor 
market, because the unemployment rate is much lower for the highly educated. 
Work history seems to matter, although the results vary across models. Tenure has an inverted 
U-shaped effect on job switch intentions (with the maximum at 10.5 years of tenure), but in 
the other equations the tenure effect is not significant. Previous changes in occupation and 
previous job switches predict current on-the-job search (Table 1, Column 2), which is in 
accordance with the “hobo syndrome” reported by Munasinghe and Sigman (2004).  
 
Employees in foreign-owned companies and in companies that are financially unstable have 
more job switch intentions. There is less search activity in regional labor markets with a high 
unemployment rate. This may be a sign of the discouraged worker effect. Furthermore, high 
regional unemployment restricts actual job switches, as expected. 
 
Overall, the results concerning the control variables vary across the models. This shows that 
our different measures of quit intentions describe slightly different kinds of labor market 
behavior. Encouragingly, the influence of adverse working conditions is somewhat more 
consistent across the models than the impact of specific worker or firm characteristics.15 
 
Results from Multivariate Probit Models. We estimate three different joint models for job 
satisfaction, quit intentions and actual job switches. These models use our three alternative 
quit intention measures. Otherwise the structure of all models is identical. We concentrate on 
the six job disamenities, Harm, Hazard, Uncertainty, Heavy Mentally, No Promotion, and 
Discrimination. Besides these, Satisfied was explained in the first stage of the multivariate 
models by variables that describe the employment relationship (Temporary, Part-Timer), the 
workplace (Shift Work, Team Work, Public Sector, Foreign Firm, dummies for plant size, 14 
industry dummies), occupation (10 occupation dummies), and the individual’s basic 
characteristics (Female, Age, Age Squared, dummies for education levels, Union Member).16  
 
We have as the dependent variable in the second stage of the models one of our three 
alternative quit intention measures, Switch Intentions, Searcher Last Six Months, or Searcher 
Last Four Weeks. In all the alternative models the explanatory variables for quit intentions 
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included Satisfied, Wage, other variables describing the pay system (Fixed Pay, Piece Rate), 
the employment relationship variables, managerial position (Manager), variables that describe 
the employer’s prospects (Growing Employment, Unstable Firm), work history variables 
(Tenure, Tenure Squared, Different Occupations, Number of Switches), the individual’s 
characteristics, and family-related variables. Finally, to explain actual job switches we 
included our measure for quit intentions (Switch Intentions, Searcher Last Six Months, or 
Searcher Last Four Weeks), all the variables included as explanatory variables in the quit 
intentions equation (except the ones for the payment system and Satisfied), and Regional 
Unemployment.  
 
The justification for the choice of variables (i.e. exclusion restrictions) is the following. The 
job satisfaction equation includes disamenities, workplace variables, and occupation that can 
be thought to affect individual’s attitude towards one’s job, but should have no direct 
relationship to planned or actual job switches. The other two equations include variables that 
relate to comparisons of alternative jobs (wage variables), variables that describe constraints 
to job switches (family variables), and variables that describe the individual’s labor market 
mobility in the past and therefore should predict quit intentions and behavior. Furthermore, a 
firm’s poor prospects may give rise to job switches. All of these variables are such that they 
should have no direct connection to job satisfaction. Regional unemployment should affect 
the realization of actual switches, rather than search and intentions. 
 
The most important results from multivariate probit models are summarized in Table 2. The 
results are reported in Table 2 in the following way. We have three alternative variables for 
quit intentions (Switch Intentions, Searcher Last Six Months, and Searcher Last Four Weeks) 
out of which only one at a time is included. We therefore have three different models to 
estimate, which are reported in different columns of the table. Each column begins with the 
description of the dependent variables in the three different stages of the multivariate model. 
For each model, the first section (1) of the table reports the coefficients of job disamenities 
from the equation for job satisfaction. The second section (2) documents the coefficients of 
Satisfied and Wage in the quit intention equation. The third section (3) of the table reports the 
coefficients of the quit intention variable and Wage from the equation for actual job switches. 
Accordingly, Table 2 documents the main coefficients of interest from three alternative 
models estimated. The coefficients of the other explanatory variables included are not 
reported in the table to save space. Note that the figures in the table are the estimated 
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coefficients, not the marginal effects, which would vary between different combinations of 
outcomes for actual job switches, employees’ quit behavior and satisfaction. 
 
The results that are reported in the first section of Table 2 reveal that the prevalence of job 
disamenities systematically decreases the level of job satisfaction, which is consistent with 
our earlier findings (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 2006). In addition, the prevalence of job 
dissatisfaction systematically intensifies the likelihood of quit intentions with all three 
alternative measures (Table 2, section (2)). The results are statistically significant at the 1% 
level and in keeping with the literature that was discussed in the Introduction. For example, 
Satisfied gets a negative coefficient (with robust z-statistic -9.08) in the model in which 
Switch Intentions are explained in the second stage of the multivariate model. Furthermore, 
job search during the last four weeks increases the likelihood of actual job switches when it is 
used as the intentions variable (Table 2, section (3)). This finding is in accordance with the 
simple cross tabulations of the variables that show that Actual Switch is most closely 
associated with a dummy that captures employees who have searched for another job during 
the last four weeks, as discussed earlier. The results on Switch Intentions are weaker.17 In 
summary, our estimation results reveal that the prevalence of perceived adverse working 
conditions increases the level of job dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction drives job search and 
this in turn induces actual job switches.18  
 
The coefficients of the wage variable are relatively low in the quit intentions equations. In 
principle, we could use the coefficients of wage and satisfaction in these equations to evaluate 
the monetary value of job satisfaction, i.e. wage compensation that would be needed to 
compensate for dissatisfaction to keep the probability of job search constant (Herzog and 
Schottman 1990). However, the figure calculated in this way is too large to be a reasonable 
estimate. (The coefficients of satisfaction are approximately ten times the absolute value of 
the corresponding coefficients of (log) wage in section (2) of Table 2.) 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper analyzed the role of adverse working conditions in the determination of 
employees’ quit behavior. We took advantage of the Finnish Quality of Work Life Survey, 
which includes not only job satisfaction scores, but also detailed information on several 
different aspects of perceived working conditions at the workplace, not just conditions typical 
of the occupation or industry that have been more commonly used in research. Moreover, the 
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QWLS data contains several different measures for quit intentions ranging from job switch 
intentions to the conduct of on-the-job search.  
 
A great advantage of the survey is that it can be matched to longitudinal employer-employee 
data, which contain comprehensive information on employees’ actual job switches. This 
allowed us to analyze the degree to which job dissatisfaction that may arise in adverse 
working conditions affects employees’ quit intentions and on-the-job search and how this 
behavior transforms itself into actual job switches. This is important, because the existing 
literature has almost exclusively examined only parts of this ‘chain’. For reasons of data 
availability, some studies have explained only quit intentions, and some have explained only 
actual quits. The data often restricts also the explanatory variables that can be used. For 
example, there is a substantial body of research that explains quits directly by means of job 
satisfaction scores, but without information on job attributes. We were able to investigate the 
issue within a uniform econometric framework that allowed us to put together a number of 
different correlations that have been documented in the earlier literature. This paper 
demonstrates that conventional wisdom in the area that is largely based on partial correlations 
can be extended to give a richer picture of the process. 
 
Our results from reduced-form models in which quit intentions are directly explained by 
individual characteristics, firm characteristics and indicators for working conditions show that 
those currently facing adverse working conditions have greater job switch intentions and 
search for new matches more frequently. Labor markets are therefore in disequilibrium at any 
given point of time in the sense that workers in adverse working conditions are forced to look 
for outside opportunities to improve their labor market position. It turns out that our different 
measures of quit intentions describe slightly different kinds of labor market behavior. The 
influence of adverse working conditions is somewhat more consistent across the models than 
the impact of specific worker or firm characteristics. Furthermore, adverse working 
conditions and actual job switches are much less connected than adverse working conditions 
and switch intentions or on-the-job search, based on the evidence from reduced-form models.  
 
The estimation of recursive multivariate probit models makes it possible to take into account 
the correlation between the error terms of the equations for job satisfaction, employees’ 
intentions to quit and actual job switches. The correlation emerges from unobservable 
individual characteristics that can be associated with employees’ attitudes and productivity, 
among other things. We find that job disamenities decrease job satisfaction and the prevalence 
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of job dissatisfaction systematically intensifies job search among the affected workers. This in 
turn leads to actual job switches. The pattern arises despite the high unemployment that 
seriously limits employees’ opportunities for finding suitable vacancies. The results for 
intentions to quit are weaker. This finding is in line with thinking that job search is a good 
predictor of actual job separations, because it constitutes an extreme form of intentions to 
quit, as argued in some earlier studies. All in all, our results call for more empirical studies 
that combine information from linked employer-employee data sources covering the ‘whole 
chain’ from job disamenities through job satisfaction to actual job switches. In particular, the 
use of linked data sets that contain survey information combined with register data make it 
possible to evaluate in detail the connection between subjective viewpoints and objective 
labor market outcomes, to which the literature has not paid much attention.  
 
References 
 
Akerlof, George A., Andrew Rose, and Janet L. Yellen. 1988. “Job Switching and Job 
Satisfaction in the US Labor Market.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2:177-248. 
 
Altonji, Joseph G., and Christina H. Paxson. 1988. “Labor Supply Preferences, Hours 
Constraints, and Hours-wage Trade-offs.” Journal of Labor Economics 6:254-276. 
 
Antecol, Heather, and Deborah Cobb-Clark. 2005. “Racial Harassment, Job Satisfaction and 
Intentions to Remain in the Military.” Discussion Paper No. 1636, IZA. 
 
Bartel, Ann P. 1982. “Wages, Nonwage Job Characteristics, and Labor Mobility.” Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 35:578-589. 
 
Blau, David M. 1991. “Search for Nonwage Job Characteristics: A Test of the Reservation 
Wage Hypothesis.” Journal of Labor Economics 9:186-205. 
 
Blau, David M. 1992. “An Empirical Analysis of Employed and Unemployed Job Search 
Behaviour.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45:738-752. 
 
Brown, Charles. 1980. “Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market.” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 94:113-134. 
 
 17
Böckerman, Petri, and Pekka Ilmakunnas. 2006. “Do Job Disamenities Raise Wages or Ruin 
Job Satisfaction?” International Journal of Manpower 27:290-302.  
 
Cappelari, Lorenzo, and Stephen P. Jenkins. 2003. “Multivariate Probit Regression Using 
Simulated Maximum Likelihood.” Stata Journal 3:278-294. 
 
Clark, Andrew E., Georgellis Yannis, and Peter Sanfey. 1998. “Job Satisfaction, Wage 
Changes, and Quits: Evidence from Germany.” Research in Labor Economics 17:95-121. 
 
Clark, Andrew E. 1996. “Job Satisfaction in Britain.” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
34:189-217. 
 
Clark, Andrew E. 2001. “What Really Matters in a Job? Hedonic Measurement Using Quit 
Data.” Labour Economics 8:223-242. 
 
Cotton, John L., and Jeffrey M. Tuttle. 1986. “Employee Turnover: A Meta-analysis and 
Review with Implications for Research.” Academy of Management Review 11:55-70. 
 
Daniel, Christophe and Catherine Sofer. 1998. “Bargaining, Compensating Wage 
Differentials, and Dualism of the Labor Market: Theory and Evidence for France.” Journal of 
Labor Economics 16:546-575.  
 
Davis, Steven J., and John Haltiwanger. 1999. “Gross Job Flows.” In Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Volume 3B, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, pp. 2711-2805. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Delfgaauw, Josse. 2007. “The Effect of Job Satisfaction on Job Search: Not Just Whether, But 
Also Where.” Labour Economics (forthcoming).    
 
Eckstein, Zvi, and Gerard G. Van den Berg. 2007. “Empirical Labor Search: A Survey.” 
Journal of Econometrics 136:531-564. 
 
Farber, Henry S. 1999. “Mobility and Stability: The Dynamics of Job Change in Labor 
Markets.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and 
David Card, pp. 2439-2483. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 18
 
Flanagan, Robert J., Gary Strauss, and Lloyd Ulman. 1974. “Worker Discontent and Work 
Place Behavior.” Industrial Relations 13:101-123. 
 
Freeman, Richard. 1978. “Job Satisfaction as an Economic Variable.” The American 
Economic Review 68:135-141. 
 
García-Serrano, Carlos. 2004. “Temporary Employment, Working Conditions and Expected 
Exits from Firms.” Labour: Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations 18:293-
316. 
 
Greene, William H. 2003. Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. 
 
Griffeth, Rodger W., Peter W. Hom, and Stefan Gaertner. 2000. “A Meta-analysis of 
Antecedents and Correlates of Employee Turnover: Update, Moderator Tests, and Research 
Implications for the Next Millennium.” Journal of Management 26:463-488. 
 
Gronberg, Timothy J., and W. Robert Reed. 1994. “Estimating Workers’ Marginal 
Willingness to Pay for Job Attributes Using Duration Data.” Journal of Human Resources 
29:911-931. 
 
Heckman, James J. 1978. “Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation 
System.” Econometrica 46:931-959. 
 
Hellman, Chan M. 1997. “Job Satisfaction and Intent to Leave.” Journal of Social Psychology 
137:677-689. 
 
Herzog, Henry W., and  Alan M. Schottmann. 1990. “Valuing Risk in the Workplace: Market 
Price, Willingness to Pay, and the Optimal Provision of Safety.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 71:463-470. 
 
Hwang, Hae-Shin, Dale T. Mortensen, and W. Robert Reed. 1998. “Hedonic Wages and 
Labor Market Search.” Journal of Labor Economics 16:815-847. 
 
 19
Hyytinen, Ari, and Pekka Ilmakunnas. 2007. “Entrepreneurial Aspirations: Another Form of 
Job Search?” Small Business Economics (forthcoming). 
 
Kristensen, Nicolai, and Niels Westergård-Nielsen. 2004. “Does Low Job Satisfaction Lead to 
Job Mobility?” Discussion Paper No. 1026, IZA. 
 
Laband, David N., and Bernard F. Lentz. 1998. “The Effects of Sexual Harassment on Job 
Satisfaction, Earnings, and Turnover Among Female Lawyers.” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 51:594-607. 
 
Lang, Kevin, and Sumon Majumdar. 2004. “The Pricing of Job Characteristics When Markets 
Do Not Clear: Theory and Policy Implications.” International Economic Review 45:1111-
1128. 
 
Lehto, Anna-Maija, and Hanna Sutela. 1999. “Efficient, More efficient, Exhausted. Findings 
of Finnish Quality of Work Life Surveys 1977-1997.” Statistics Finland, SVT: Labour Market 
1999:8.  
 
Lévy-Garboua, Louis, Claude Montmarquette, and Véronique Simonnnet. 2007. “Job 
Satisfaction and Quits.” Labour Economics 14:251-268.  
 
Maddala, G.S. 1983. Limited-dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Manning, Alan. 2003. Monopsony in Motion. Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Monfardini, Chiara, and Rosalba Radice. 2006. “Testing Exogeneity in the Bivariate Probit 
Model: A Monte Carlo Study.” Department of Economics, University of Bologna, 
Unpublished. 
 
Munasinghe, Lalith, and Karl Sigman. 2004. “A Hobo Syndrome? Mobility, Wages, and Job 
Turnover.” Labour Economics 11:191-218. 
 
 20
Pissarides, Christopher A., and Jonathan Wadsworth. 1994. “On-the-Job Search: Some 
Empirical Evidence from Britain.” European Economic Review 38:385-401.  
 
Monfardini, Chiara, and Rosalba Radice. 2006. “Testing Exogeneity in the Bivariate Probit 
Model: A Monte Carlo Study.” Department of Economics, University of Bologna, 
Unpublished. 
 
Scott, Anthony, Hugh Gravelle, Steven Simoens, Chris Bojke, and Bonnie Sibbald. 2006. 
“Job Satisfaction and Quitting Intentions: A Structural Model of British General 
Practitioners.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 44:519-540.  
 
Shields, Michael A., and Stephen W. Price. 2002. “Racial Harassment, Job Satisfaction and 
Intentions to Quit: Evidence from the British Nursing Profession.” Economica 69:295-326. 
 
Sousa-Poza, Alfonso and Fred Henneberger. 2004. “Analyzing Job Mobility with Job 
Turnover Intentions: An International Comparative Study.” Journal of Economic Issues 
38:113-137. 
 
Steel, Robert P., and Nestor K. Orvalle II. 1984. “A Review and Meta-Analysis of Research 
on the Relationship Between Behavioral Intentions and Employee Turnover.” Journal of 
Applied Psychology 69:673-686. 
 
Tett, Robert P. and John P. Meyer. 1993. “Job Satisfaction, Organizational Commitment, 
Turnover Intention, and Turnover: Path Analyses Based on Meta-analytic Findings.” 
Personnel Psychology 46:259-293. 
 
Van Ophem, Hans. 1991. “Wages, Nonwage Job Characteristics and the Search Behavior of 
Employees.” Review of Economics and Statistics 73:145-151. 
 
Wilde, Joachim. 2000. “Identification of Multiple Equation Probit Models with Endogenous 
Dummy Regressors.” Economics Letters 69:309-312. 
 
 
 21
TABLE 1: MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM REDUCED-FORM PROBIT MODELS 
 
 Switch  
Intentions,  
Probit model  
Searcher Last  
Six Months,  
Probit model  
Searcher Last  
Four Weeks,  
Probit model  
Actual Switch, 
Probit model 
     
Harm 0.070 0.006 0.018 0.024 
 (2.95)*** (0.46) (2.56)** (1.02) 
Hazard 0.013 0.018 -0.000 -0.041 
 (0.57) (1.37) (0.07) (1.83)* 
Uncertainty 0.097 0.025 0.014 0.008 
 (4.55)*** (2.05)** (2.19)** (0.37) 
Neglect 0.053 0.042 0.013 -0.048 
 (2.10)** (2.88)*** (1.81)* (1.97)** 
Heavy Mentally 0.104 0.004 0.006 0.076 
 (2.54)** (0.20) (0.50) (1.90)* 
No Promotion 0.084 0.040 0.017 -0.060 
 (3.80)*** (3.35)*** (2.76)*** (2.86)*** 
Discrimination 0.099 0.063 0.009 0.037 
 (4.43)*** (4.82)*** (1.41) (1.69)* 
     
Shift Work 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.059 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (1.24) 
Temporary 0.016 0.098 0.052 -0.030 
 (0.50) (5.35)*** (4.79)*** (0.97) 
Part-Timer -0.053 0.072 0.045 -0.050 
 (1.50) (3.56)*** (3.95)*** (1.50) 
Fixed Pay 0.028 0.025 -0.008 -0.024 
 (0.92) (1.49) (0.89) (0.80) 
Piece Rate 0.090 0.005 -0.009 -0.036 
 (1.35) (0.13) (0.59) (0.58) 
Team Work -0.027 0.006 -0.003 0.017 
 (1.20) (0.46) (0.46) (0.81) 
     
Female 0.004 -0.021 -0.003 -0.045 
 (0.17) (1.68)* (0.40) (2.07)** 
Age 0.008 0.011 0.002 -0.001 
 (1.08) (2.44)** (0.71) (0.08) 
Age Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.78)* (3.24)*** (1.11) (0.98) 
Married -0.029 0.003 -0.003 0.017 
 (1.19) (0.21) (0.41) (0.72) 
Spouse Working 0.023 -0.013 0.006 0.017 
 (0.98) (1.05) (0.90) (0.74) 
Secondary Education 0.024 0.022 0.018 -0.011 
 (0.93) (1.49) (2.25)** (0.45) 
Polytechnic Education 0.106 0.074 0.031 0.015 
 (2.78)*** (2.93)*** (2.13)** (0.42) 
University Education 0.115 0.049 0.019 0.004 
 (2.64)*** (1.76)* (1.16) (0.09) 
Union Member -0.028 -0.004 -0.006 0.009 
 (1.05) (0.29) (0.83) (0.36) 
Manager 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.022 
 (0.35) (0.08) (0.18) (1.00) 
     
Tenure 0.009 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 
 (2.12)** (1.17) (1.15) (1.47) 
Tenure Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (3.12)*** (0.68) (0.24) (1.47) 
Different Occupations -0.027 0.041 0.009 -0.043 
 (0.90) (2.43)** (1.05) (1.49) 
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Number of Switches  0.008 0.013 0.001 0.010 
 (1.22) (3.33)*** (0.81) (1.52) 
     
Public Sector 0.020 -0.011 -0.000 0.097 
 (0.53) (0.60) (0.03) (2.66)*** 
Foreign Firm 0.105 -0.018 -0.000 0.002 
 (2.61)*** (0.85) (0.02) (0.04) 
Plant Size 10-49 -0.002 -0.014 -0.004 -0.022 
 (0.07) (1.02) (0.62) (0.89) 
Plant Size 50-499 -0.026 -0.019 -0.011 -0.032 
 (0.88) (1.19) (1.35) (1.13) 
Plant Size > 499 -0.015 -0.011 0.001 0.057 
 (0.33) (0.47) (0.05) (1.34) 
Growing Employment -0.000 -0.004 -0.010 0.043 
 (0.01) (0.21) (1.16) (1.36) 
Unstable Firm 0.065 0.014 0.001 0.033 
 (2.29)** (0.88) (0.20) (1.21) 
     
Regional Unemployment -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.014 
 (0.51) (3.49)*** (2.86)*** (6.56)*** 
     
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.210 0.192 0.071 
Observations 2767 2811 2812 2822 
 
NOTE: Robust z statistics are reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 2: RESULTS FROM MULTIVARIATE PROBIT MODELS 
 
 Dependent variable of multivariate model 
Explanatory variable (1) Satisfied 
(2) Switch  
Intentions  
(3) Actual Switch 
(1) Satisfied 
(2) Searcher Last 
Six Months 
(3) Actual Switch 
(1) Satisfied 
(2) Searcher Last 
Four Weeks 
(3) Actual Switch 
(1)    
Harm -0.304 
(4.72)*** 
-0.293 
(4.58)*** 
-0.307 
(4.84)*** 
Hazard -0.075 
(1.22) 
-0.063 
(1.03) 
-0.053 
(0.87) 
Uncertainty -0.216 
(3.91)*** 
-0.193 
(3.54)*** 
-0.199 
(3.66)*** 
Heavy Mentally -0.038 
(0.33) 
-0.024 
(0.22) 
-0.028 
(0.25) 
No Promotion -0.436 
(7.75)*** 
-0.444 
(7.96)*** 
-0.442 
(7.96)*** 
Discrimination -0.435 
(7.09)*** 
-0.432 
(7.10)*** 
-0.412 
(6.81)*** 
 
(2)     
Satisfied  -0.974 
(-9.08)*** 
-0.912 
(-6.41)*** 
-1.038 
(-6.42)*** 
Wage 0.178 
(3.12)** 
-0.123 
(-1.87)* 
-0.093 
(-1.18) 
(3)    
Switch Intentions  0.204 
(1.51) 
  
Searcher Last Six 
Months 
 0.021 
(0.16) 
 
Searcher Last Four 
Weeks 
  0.342 
(2.24)** 
Wage  0.341 
(5.54)*** 
0.339 
(5.69)*** 
0.341 
(5.73)*** 
 
NOTE: Each column of the table reports the key variables of interest from one of the three different 
specifications of the multivariate probit model. The dependent variable in the second stage of the models is one 
of our three alternative quit intention measures, Switch Intentions, Searcher Last Six Months, or Searcher Last 
Four Weeks. Otherwise the structure of all three models is identical. The unreported control variables are 
explained in detail in the text; the results on them are available upon request. Robust z statistics are reported in 
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Variable Average 
(standard 
deviation) 
Definition/measurement  
   
Job switch intentions:   
   
Switch Intentions 0.495 
(0.500) 
Would change jobs at the same level of pay = 1, otherwise = 0  (sum 
of Would Switch to Same Field and Would Switch to Other Field) 
Would Switch to Same Field 0.240 
(0.427) 
If could change jobs at the same level of pay, would change to the 
same occupational field = 1, otherwise = 0 
Would Switch to Other Field 0.255 
(0.436) 
If could change jobs at the same level of pay, would change to a 
different occupational field = 1, otherwise = 0 
   
On-the-job search:   
   
Searcher Last Six Months 0.152 
(0.359) 
Has looked for another job in the last six months = 1, otherwise = 0  
Searcher Last Four Weeks 0.064 
(0.244) 
Has looked for another job during the last four weeks = 1,  
Otherwise = 0 
   
Actual job switch:   
   
Actual Switch 0.384 
(0.487) 
Has switched plant at least once during the period of 1998-2002 = 1,  
Otherwise = 0. Information is based on plant codes in FLEED. 
   
Job satisfaction:   
   
Satisfied 0.306 
(0.461) 
Job satisfaction is measured by means of alternatives 1 (very 
satisfied), 2 (quite satisfied), 3 (rather dissatisfied), and 4 (very 
dissatisfied). The satisfied variable gets value one for the highest 
satisfaction category 1, otherwise = 0. 
   
Wage:   
   
Wage 2.411 
(0.549) 
Logarithm of hourly earnings that is calculated based on the annual 
earnings (FIM) obtained from tax registers and by using regular 
weekly hours from LFS. 
  
Working conditions:  
   
Harm  0.287 
(0.452) 
At least one adverse factor that affects work ‘very much’ (includes 
heat, cold, vibration, draught, noise, smoke, gas and fumes, humidity, 
dry indoor air, dust, dirtiness of work environment, poor or glaring 
lighting, irritating or corrosive substances, restless work environment, 
repetitive, monotonous movements, difficult or uncomfortable 
working positions, time pressure and tight time schedules, heavy 
lifting, lack of space, mildew in buildings) = 1, otherwise = 0 
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Hazard 0.338 
(0.473) 
At least one factor is experienced as ‘a distinct hazard’ (includes 
accident risk, becoming subject to physical violence, hazards caused 
by chemical substances, radiation hazard, major catastrophe hazard, 
hazard of infectious diseases, hazard of skin diseases, cancer risk, risk 
of strain injuries, risk of succumbing to mental disturbance, risk of 
grave work exhaustion, risk of causing serious injury to others, risk of 
causing serious damage to valuable equipment or product) = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
Uncertainty 0.577 
(0.494) 
Work carries at least one insecurity factor (includes transfer to other 
duties, threat of temporary dismissal, threat of permanent dismissal, 
threat of unemployment, threat of becoming incapable of work, 
unforeseen changes) = 1, otherwise = 0 
Neglect 0.226 
(0.418) 
At least one supportive factor ‘never’ experienced in work (includes 
advice or help, support and encouragement from superiors, support 
and encouragement from co-workers, feel of being a valued member 
of work community, opportunity to plan work, opportunity to apply 
own ideas in work, feel of own work as productive and useful) = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
Heavy Mentally 0.065 
(0.246) 
Current tasks mentally ‘very demanding’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
No Promotion 0.622 
(0.485) 
Advancement opportunities in current workplace ‘poor’ = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
Discrimation 0.299 
(0.458) 
Has fallen subject to at least one type of unequal treatment or 
discrimination in current workplace (includes time of hiring, 
remuneration, career advancement opportunities, access to training 
arranged by employer, receiving information, attitudes of co-workers 
or superiors) = 1, otherwise = 0  
  
Working time:  
   
Shift Work 0.044 
(0.205) 
Uninterrupted 3-shift work = 1, otherwise  = 0 
Temporary 0.180 
(0.385) 
Fixed-term employment relationship = 1, otherwise = 0 
Part-Timer 0.102 
(0.303) 
Part-time work = 1, otherwise = 0 
   
Payment system:   
   
Fixed Pay 0.838 
(0.368) 
Fixed monthly or hourly pay (including shift work supplement) = 1,  
otherwise = 0 
Piece Rate 0.025 
(0.157) 
Payment system is based on only piece-work or commission pay = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
Team Work 0.316 
(0.465) 
Works in teams ‘almost all the time’ or ‘about three quarters of the 
time’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
   
Human capital variables:  
   
Female 0.531 
(0.499) 
1 = female, 0 = male 
Age 39.928 
(10.487) 
Age of an employee 
Age Squared  1687.546 
(833.570) 
Age squared 
Married 0.561 
(0.496) 
Married=1, otherwise=0 
Spouse Working 0.558 
(0.497) 
Spouse is working = 1, otherwise = 0 
Comprehensive Education 0.238 
(0.426) 
Comprehensive education = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
Secondary Education  0.115 
(0.496) 
Upper secondary or vocational education = 1, otherwise = 0 
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Polytechnic Education 0.115 
(0.319) 
Polytechnic or lower university degree = 1, otherwise = 0 
University Education 0.087 
(0.282) 
Higher university degree = 1, otherwise = 0 
Union Member 0.791 
(0.407) 
Member of trade union = 1, otherwise = 0 
Manager 0.317 
(0.466) 
Tasks involve supervision of work of others or delegation of tasks = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
   
Work history:  
   
Tenure 9.558 
(9.317) 
Number of years in the current firm 
Tenure Squared 178.129 
(275.245) 
Tenure squared 
Different Occupations 0.130 
(0.336) 
Has been in more than three distinctly different kinds of 
occupations during his/her life = 1, otherwise = 0 
Number of Switches 0.742 
(1.645) 
Number of job switches during the past five years 
   
Information about employer:  
   
Public Sector 0.343 
(0.475) 
Employer is state or municipality = 1, otherwise  = 0 
Foreign Firm 0.071 
(0.258) 
Employer is private, mainly foreign-owned enterprise = 1,  
otherwise = 0 
Plant Size <10 0.276 
(0.447) 
Size of plant under 10 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
Plant Size 10-49 0.363 
(0.481) 
Size of plant 10-49 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Plant Size 50-499 0.280 
(0.499) 
Size of plant 50-499 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Plant Size > 499 0.081 
(0.273) 
Size of plant over 499 employees = 1, otherwise = 0  
Growing Employment 0.109 
(0.311) 
The number of employees has increased in the plant during the past 
three years = 1, otherwise = 0 
Unstable Firm 0.159 
(0.365) 
Financial situation is ‘unstable’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
   
Regional variable:   
   
Regional Unemployment 17.071 
(4.743) 
The regional unemployment rate based on 12 NUTS3-regions 
(Source: LFS by Statistics Finland). 
   
Indicators for industries and occupations:  
   
Industries   14 dummies based on Standard Industry Classification 
Occupations   10 dummies based on the classification of occupations by SF 
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1 Laband and Lentz (1998), among others, estimate reduced-form models for intentions to quit. In a choice 
model we could think that a latent quit intention is the difference of random utilities in another job and the 
present job. However, since we have data only on the attributes of the current job, it is difficult to justify the 
model with a random utility framework. 
 
2 For this reason, we have examined the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for Finland, which is 
available over the period 1998-2001. There have not been substantial changes in the average level of job 
satisfaction among wage and salary earners. 
 
3 The model is discussed, for example, in Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003). It is a special case of the model 
originally proposed by Heckman (1978). 
 
4 Using the exclusion restrictions also improves the validity of tests of exogeneity of the potentially endogenous 
explanatory dummy variables (essentially, tests of whether the correlations of the errors of the probit models are 
zero) when the distributional assumptions are misspecified (see Monfardini and Radice, 2006). 
 
5 Unemployment is almost three times higher in some regions of Eastern and Northern Finland compared to 
some regions in Southern Finland.  
 
6 As most quits involve moving to higher pay, it is likely that the measures of intentions that are available in the 
QWLS data do not fully pick up job search as the theory understands it. 
 
7 We note that there are also some other possible job switch intention measures, like retirement intentions and 
aspirations to become an entrepreneur. For example, Hyytinen and Ilmakunnas (2007) examine the determinants 
of entrepreneurial intentions using the QWLS data and find that job dissatisfaction increases entrepreneurial 
aspirations.  
 
8 To test whether this data problem matters, we included in the models an indicator for the subgroup who report a 
search over the past four weeks, but who do not report a search over the past six months. It is not statistically 
significant at the standard 5% level in the models that are reported in the 1st and the 4th columns of Table 1 and 
the other results remain the same. 
 
9 We assume that a person is in the same job at the moment of the QWLS interview and at the end of December 
1997. It is possible that a person has changed jobs between October and the end of December, but the number of 
this kind of persons is arguably not particularly large. We can link the QWLS data backward to FLEED and 
check the plant codes for the persons in the QWLS data in the year 1996. By doing this, we can calculate the 
number of persons that have changed their job during the whole of 1997. It turns out that 821 persons (27.6% of 
the total number of persons included in QWLS) changed their jobs during the year 1997 (i.e. between the end of 
December 1996 and the end of December 1997). If we assume that worker turnover has been constant within the 
year 1997 and all responses to the QWLS data are from September, we can obtain an estimate that some 200 
persons (around 7% of the total number of persons included in QWLS) changed their job between October and 
the end of December 1997. Since the interviews were spread out in the period between September and 
December, the likely number of job switchers is much smaller.  
 
10 It is important to keep in mind that the distinction between quits and layoffs is not clear from the theoretical 
perspective, because employers can always, at least in principle, decrease workers’ wages in order to produce 
(’voluntary’) quits. 
 
11 We have tested whether job satisfaction directly explains employees’ intentions to quit and actual job 
separations by using the models reported in Table 1. In general, job satisfaction is statistically significant with a 
negative coefficient as expected, but the results on job disamenities remain almost unchanged. The problem with 
the job satisfaction variable (Satisfied) is that it is arguably strongly endogenous in the equations, because job 
disamenities decrease job satisfaction, based on the evidence from the QWLS data (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas 
2006). 
 
12 We have investigated the robustness of our baseline results by using different definitions for job disamenities. 
The definition of job disamenites (Harm, Hazard, Uncertainty, Neglect and Discrimination) can be made tighter 
by requiring that there must be at least three clearly adverse aspects at the workplace. For instance, in this case 
the average values for the Harm and Hazard variables are around 0.05 (i.e. 5 percent of the employees face 
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harms or hazards), in comparison to the values 0.29 and 0.34, respectively, in the baseline specification. Our 
results reported in Tables 1-2 are robust in this respect.  
 
13 In the same way, it has been a common finding in the literature on compensating wage differentials that job 
disamenities may obtain insignificant or even wrong-signed coefficients in the wage equations (e.g. Brown 
1980). One reason for this is that groups of the labor force with very low unobserved productivity characteristics 
end up with poor jobs with adverse working conditions, but they have little bargaining power to negotiate higher 
wages. 
 
14 Broadly speaking, these findings are in line with the literature. For instance, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) 
discover that temporary or part-time employment encourages on-the-job search.  
 
15 We have estimated all models separately for the private sector and the public sector. There are evidently some 
differences in the results between the sectors. Nevertheless, job disamenities matter for employees’ intentions to 
quit and on-the-job-search in both sectors. Furthermore, we have estimated reduced-form models where actual 
job mobility is explained with our measures of intentions to quit and the basic controls of Table 1. Those models 
reveal that all the alternative variables that capture intentions (Switch Intentions, Searcher Last Six Months and 
Searcher Last Four Weeks) are statistically significant explanatory variables for actual job switches. 
 
16 Wage is not included in the job satisfaction equation, because it is not a statistically significant explanatory 
variable for the level of job satisfaction. 
 
17 We have estimated the multivariate probit model also without a separate equation for employees’ intentions to 
quit. This specification contains two equations. (One is for job satisfaction and the other one is for actual job 
switches, explained by quit intentions and job satisfaction.) In this case all the alternative variables that capture 
intentions (Switch Intentions, Searcher Last Six Months and Searcher Last Four Weeks) were statistically 
significant explanatory variables for actual job switches. 
 
18 When Searcher Last Four Weeks is one of the dependent variables in the three-equation probit model, the 
correlations of the errors of the probit equations are jointly significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
